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BEZIO V. DRAEGER: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY FOR A DOCTRINAL SOLUTION TO THE 
JURISDICTIONAL SPLIT AS TO THE ARBITRABILITY OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 
By 
Brian Cressman*
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 In Bezio v. Draeger,
1
 the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the holding of 
the District Court of Maine that pre-dispute malpractice arbitration agreements are valid.  
In doing so, however, the First Circuit reached its holding on a more conservative 
rationale than the District Court.  The District Court relied on the Federal Arbitration Act 
(“FAA”)2 preemption doctrine, while the First Circuit backpedaled from the District 
Court’s holding, instead relying on state ethical advisory opinions to reach its holding. 
With this switch in rationale, the First Circuit missed an opportunity to establish a 
doctrinal resolution to a jurisdictional split defined by state ethics advisory opinions and 
ABA ethics opinions.
3
  Therefore, while Bezio established the important holding that in 
Maine pre-dispute malpractice arbitration agreements are valid, the backpedaling of the 
First Circuit minimized the effect of the holding.
4
  Even though the First Circuit’s 
holding is consistent with the preemption doctrine, the First Circuit’s result is more a 
matter of happenstance than sound reasoning.  This result likely serves as an inadvertent 
approval of reliance on state advisory opinions, which in their own right, at times, 
arguably create a threshold barrier to arbitration that conflicts with the FAA preemption 
doctrine.
5
 
 
 
II. BACKGROUND FACTS 
 
Plaintiff Douglas G. Bezio was represented by Bernstein, Shur, Sawyer, and 
Nelson (“BSSN”) regarding an alleged violation of Maine state security laws brought by 
the Maine Office of Securities.
6
  On September 26, 2011, Bezio signed a consent order in 
which he agreed not to contest the State’s conclusion that he violated Maine state 
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1
 Bezio v. Draeger, 737 F.3d 819 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 
2
 9 U.S.C. §1 et seq. (2012). 
 
3
 See infra notes 43-48. 
 
4
 See infra notes 81-84. 
 
5
 See infra notes 71-79. 
 
6
 Bezio v. Draeger, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99291, at *1, 2 (D. Me. 2013). 
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securities laws.
7
  Bezio, employed with a securities firm in Massachusetts, was fired from 
his job as soon as the consent order was published.
8
  Bezio claimed that BSSN committed 
malpractice by failing to include his employer in the process of negotiating the consent 
order, and leading him to believe the consent order would have no impact outside of the 
state of Maine.
9
  Bezio alleged that, because of BSSN’s malpractice he lost his 
livelihood, or at the least the lost value of transferring his book of business.
10
 
Upon hiring BSSN, Bezio was sent a three-page engagement letter dated March 
18, 2011.
11
  Attached, and incorporated by reference in the engagement letter was a four-
page document entitled “Standard Terms of Engagement.”12  Bezio executed the 
engagement letter, and initialed every page of both the engagement letter and standard 
terms of engagement attachment.
13
  The “Standard Term Attachment” included a section 
entitled “Arbitration,” in pertinent part as follows: 
 
If you disagree with the amount of our fee, please take up the 
question with your principal attorney contact or with the firm’s 
managing partner.  Typically, such disagreements are resolved to 
the satisfaction of both sides with little inconvenience or formality.  
In the event of a fee dispute that is not readily resolved, you shall 
have the right to submit the fee dispute to arbitration under the 
Maine Code of Professional Responsibility.  Any fee dispute that 
you do not submit to arbitration under the Maine Code of 
Professional Responsibility, and any other dispute that arises out of 
or relates to this agreement or the services provided by the law 
firm shall also, at the election of either party, be subject to binding 
arbitration.  Either party may request such arbitration by sending a 
written demand for arbitration to the other.
14
 
 
 BSSN moved for dismissal of Bezio’s claim and to compel arbitration.15  Bezio 
submitted that fee disputes were arbitrable, but opposed the dismissal of his legal 
                                                 
7
 Bezio, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99291, at *2. 
 
8
 Id. 
 
9
 Id. 
 
10
 Id. at *2-3. Bezio alleges that at minimum he lost the value of his book of business.  His rationalization is 
that if he were properly informed regarding the ramifications of his consent decree, he could have 
transferred his book of business in an orderly manner prior to losing his job. 
 
11
 Id. at 3. 
 
12
 Id. 
 
13
 Bezio, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99291, at *3. 
 
14
 Bezio, 737 F.3d at 821. 
 
15
 Bezio, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99291, at *4. 
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malpractice claim.
16
  Bezio was not advised to seek outside counsel, nor did BSSN 
review the arbitration clause included in the Standard Terms Attachment with Bezio prior 
to Bezio executing the agreement.
17
  No one at BSSN alerted Bezio to the consequences 
of submitting claims to arbitration, including surrendering the right to a trial by jury.
18
  In 
addition, Bezio and BSSN never discussed the possibility of arbitrating his malpractice 
claims.
19
  As a result, Bezio argued that BSSN could not force arbitration of his 
malpractice claims because BSSN failed to obtain his informed consent to arbitrate those 
claims.
20
  BSSN, for its part, argued that the FAA requires the court to enforce the 
arbitration clause as written, even though Bezio had not granted informed consent.
21
   
 The District Court of Maine dismissed Bezio’s case and granted BSSN’s motion 
to compel arbitration.
22
  The District Court was admittedly reluctant to join the state-by-
state debate regarding arbitrability of malpractice claims in an attorney-client arbitration 
agreement; instead, the District Court found that the FAA governed the case and must be 
followed.
23
  As a result, the District Court’s rationale largely relied on the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto.24  As the District Court stated, 
Casarotto “instructed that the FAA’s goals and policies are considered antithetical to 
threshold limitations placed specifically and solely on arbitration provisions.”25  Further, 
a court cannot “effect what…the state legislature cannot,” in holding arbitration clauses 
unconscionable.
26
  The District Court stated that if it held the arbitration clause 
unenforceable because BSSN needed to obtain informed consent from Bezio, “it would 
                                                 
16
 Bezio, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99291, at *4. 
 
17
 Id. 
 
18
 Bezio, 737 F.3d at 821. 
 
19
 Id. 
 
20
 Bezio, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99291, at *4. 
 
21
 Id. 
 
22
 Id. at 11. 
 
23
 Id. at 7 n.3. 
 
24
 See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (invalidating a Montana statute which 
required special notice in regards to an arbitration agreement in a contract); see also Bezio, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 99291 at 6-9. 
  
25
 Bezio, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99291, at *7 (citing Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 429 n.9). 
 
26
 Id. (citing Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 689 n.3) (internal citation omitted); see Casaratto, 517 U.S. at 687 
(“[u]nder Southland and Perry, state legislation requiring greater information or choice in the making of 
agreements to arbitrate than in other contracts is preempted.”  Note 3 of Casaratto thus clarifies, a court 
may not “rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that 
enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would enable the court to effect what…the state legislature 
cannot.”). 
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be establishing a requirement applicable only to arbitration clauses.”27  Such a holding 
would be futile and displaced by the FAA preemption doctrine.
28
  As a result of the 
District Court’s dismissal of Bezio’s case and order to compel arbitration, Bezio appealed 
to the First Circuit Court of Appeals.
29
 
 
 
III. COURT’S ANALYSIS 
 
The First Circuit affirmed the District Court’s holding, but in doing so applied a 
different rationale.  According to the First Circuit, Maine law permits attorneys to enforce 
arbitration agreements like the one at issue in Bezio.
30
  The rationale of the First Circuit 
relied on three prongs: (1) Maine Professional Ethics Commission’s Advisory Opinion 
170; (2) the views of the American Bar Association; and (3) the “liberal federal”31 and 
state policy favoring arbitration.
32
   
Of primacy in the Circuit Court’s rationale, Maine Advisory Opinion 170 states 
that: “a lawyer and a client may indeed, under the Maine Bar Rules, include in their 
initial engagement agreement a clause compelling arbitration of any and all malpractice 
claims as long as the clause does not preclude the client from requiring resolution of any 
fee disputes pursuant to Rule 9.”33  Further, a decision inconsistent with Advisory 
Opinion 170 would be inconsistent with the liberal state and federal policies favoring 
arbitration.
34
  Finally, Advisory Opinion 170 explicitly stated that the “presence of an 
arbitration clause in an engagement agreement, without more, [does not] require that the 
client be advised to consult with other counsel.”35  Thus, according to the First Circuit, 
the Maine Professional Ethics Commission has “expressly rejected Bezio’s informed 
consent argument.”36 
Lastly, the court opined that ABA Ethics Opinions guided to the same result as 
Advisory Opinion 170.
37
  According to the First Circuit, ABA Formal Opinion 02-425 
                                                 
27
 Bezio, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99291, at *9. 
 
28
 Id.; see infra notes 71-79. 
 
29
 Bezio, 737 F.3d at 820. 
 
30
 Id. at 823. 
  
31
 See Moses H. Cone Mem’l. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
 
32
 Bezio, 737 F.3d at 823. 
 
33
 Id. at 823-24. 
 
34
 Id. at 824. 
 
35
 Id. 
   
36
 Id. 
  
37
 Id. at 825. 
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established that mandatory arbitration provisions were proper, unless the agreement 
limited the lawyer from liability to which they would otherwise be exposed.
38
  As 
arbitration is simply the choice of “a neutral forum to adjudicate liability…and not an 
agreement limiting a lawyer’s liability,”39 an agreement to arbitrate malpractice claims, 
according to the court, is arbitrable pursuant to ABA guideline opinions.
40
   
 
 
IV. SIGNIFICANCE 
 
While fee dispute arbitration is a generally accepted facet of the attorney-client 
agreement,
41
 the arbitrability of malpractice claims diverges greatly based on 
jurisdiction.
42
  The state to state variation is often the result of differing state bar views as 
to whether arbitration of malpractice claims “limits a lawyer’s liability.”43  Some states 
require that attorneys drafting malpractice arbitration clauses owe a duty to require their 
potential client to seek independent counsel to review a retainer agreement compelling 
arbitration of malpractice claims.
44
  Other states require an attorney to explain the 
benefits of arbitration to a client, and obtain informed consent as to arbitrability of 
                                                 
38
 Bezio, 737 F.3d at 825. 
 
39
 Id. at 824. 
 
40
 Id. at 825. 
 
41
 THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 361 (5th ed. 2014). Many, if 
not most, bar associations have implemented arbitral procedures for addressing fee disputes.  Rule 1.5 of 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC) authorizes “fee arbitration programs”; in fact, there are 
ABA Model Rules for Fee Arbitration.  The MRPC, however, does not address instances in which the 
arbitral procedures apply to malpractice claims. 
 
42
 See Gorden v. Lloyd Ward & Assoc., P.C., No. 31399-9-111 (Wash. App. April 9, 2014) (arbitration 
clause was unenforceable because it was not explained to clients); Smith v. Lindemann, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 27065 (D.N.J. March 3, 2014) (legal malpractice arbitration clauses are enforceable); 
Vandekerckhove v. Scarfone, 2012 Mich. App. LEXIS 1961 (Mich. App. Oct. 11, 2012) (malpractice 
arbitration agreement is enforceable); Hodges v. Reasonover, 2012 La. LEXIS 1962 (La. July 2, 2012) 
(pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate legal malpractice claims are enforceable so long as the attorney 
discloses the waiver of rights in agreeing to arbitrate); Johnson, Pope, Bokor, Ruppel & Burns, LLP v. 
Forier, 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 8899 (Fla. App. June 18, 2011) (holding that pre-dispute agreements to 
arbitrate legal malpractice claims are enforceable); Desert Outdoor Advertising v. Superior Court, 2011 
Cal. App. LEXIS 784 (Cal. App. June 17, 2011) (an arbitration agreement added mid-representation  was 
enforceable); Broadcast News Networks, Inc. v. Loeb & Loeb, LLP, 834 N.Y.S.2d 656 (N.Y. App. 2007) 
(malpractice arbitration agreement enforceable); Thornton v. Higgins, 2003 Ohio 7078 (Ohio App. 2003) 
(pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate malpractice claims are not enforceable). 
 
43
 Louis A. Russo, The Consequences of Arbitrating A Legal Malpractice Claim: Rebuilding Faith in the 
Legal Profession, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 327, 350 (2006) (see Pennsylvania Rule 1.8(h)(1) of PA 
disciplinary rules of professional conduct), but see MAINE PROFESSION ETHICS COMMISSION, OPINION 
#170 (1999) (Attorneys’ and Clients’ Agreement to Arbitrate Future Malpractice Claim) (arbitration is a 
choice of forum and not a “limitation on liability”). 
 
44
 Id. at 345 (such states include Texas, Illinois, and Pennsylvania). 
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malpractice claims.
45
  The states requiring informed consent generally rely on the ABA’s 
guidance.
46
  The guidance most commonly cited is as follows: 
 
The American Bar Association discussed this matter in a 2002 
formal ethical opinion. Essentially, the ABA found that an 
agreement to arbitrate legal malpractice claims is ethical and 
permitted when: (1) the client is fully apprised of the advantages 
and disadvantages of arbitration; (2) the client is given sufficient 
information to permit her to make an informed decision about 
whether to agree to the inclusion of the arbitration provision in the 
retainer; and (3) the arbitration clause does not insulate the 
attorney from liability or limit the liability to which she would 
otherwise be exposed under common or statutory law.
47
 
 
 Some states, including Maine, find that malpractice claims are fully arbitrable.
48
  
State rules delineating to what extent an attorney may agree to arbitrate malpractice 
claims with a client are embodied not in law, but in advisory opinions of state bars.  
Courts then rely on those opinions, and in doing so establish the law of a particular state 
as the case presents itself.  Thus, the jurisdictional variability on the issue largely is a 
result of differing professional responsibility rules, differing advisory opinions on those 
rules, and differing application by courts.  At the heart of this balancing is the liberal 
policy favoring arbitration coming to a head with professional responsibility rules 
delineating the permitted attorney-client relationship.
49
   
Bezio is important because the rationale of the District Court of Maine and the 
First Circuit presents two differing views as to why malpractice claims are arbitrable.  
The First Circuit based its decision primarily on an analysis of advisory professional 
responsibility opinions, which is a timid approach.  On the other hand, the District Court, 
in contrasting and more persuasive reasoning, provides an analysis of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence and the FAA preemption doctrine.  The District Court’s analysis is free of 
jurisdictional anchoring, and provides a compelling doctrinal argument that does not shy 
away from the underlying clash between the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration 
and responsibilities of attorneys to their clients.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45
 Russo, supra note 43, at 352 (such states include California, New York, and New Jersey). 
 
46
 ABA COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, FORMAL OP. 02-425 (2002) (discussing retainer 
agreements requiring the arbitration of fee disputes and malpractice claims). 
 
47
 Russo, supra note 43, at 352.   
 
48
 MAINE PROF’L ETHICS COMM’N, OP. #170 (1999) (Attorneys’ and Clients’ Agreement to Arbitrate 
Future Malpractice Claim). 
 
49
 See supra note 42 for a sampling of cases, including cases finding malpractice claims arbitrable. 
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V. CRITIQUE 
 
In affirming the District Court on other grounds, the First Circuit failed to 
establish a doctrinal answer to the issue of whether the FAA pre-empts professional 
responsibility rules.  Instead, the First Circuit returned to familiar rationale, by leaning on 
advisory opinions to reach its conclusion.  However, these specific advisory opinions 
relied on by courts with respect to the issue of arbitrability of legal malpractice claims are 
responsible for the split in authority on the issue.  
The First Circuit mentioned the liberal policy favoring arbitration in a token way; 
however, their answer to the issue of the arbitrability of malpractice claims was fully 
answered by Advisory Opinion #170, entitled “Attorneys’ and Clients’ Agreement to 
Arbitrate Future Malpractice Claims.”50  The only hurdle opined by Maine’s Professional 
Ethics Commission was whether arbitration “limited the lawyer’s liability” in offense of 
the rules.
51
  However, despite a dissenting view that arbitration did, in fact, limit 
malpractice liability,
52
 the Professional Ethics Commission found that “there is nothing in 
the language of the rule, or its history, to support the proposition that a mutual agreement 
on a neutral forum within which to adjudicate a lawyer’s future liability is an agreement 
limiting the lawyer’s liability.”53  Additionally, the Professional Ethics Commission 
found that notions of conflicts of interest in agreeing to arbitrate were unfounded, and 
thus attorneys are not required to refer clients to independent counsel to review attorney-
client engagement letters as they pertain to arbitrating malpractice claims.
54
 Therefore, 
despite contrary holdings in other jurisdictions,
55
 Maine’s Professional Ethics 
                                                 
50
 Maine Op. #170, supra note 48. 
 
51
 Id. 
 
52
 Id. The dissenting view posited that arbitration limited the odds of recovery, by its very nature limiting 
the lawyer’s liability.  However the majority responded: “If we were to accept the proposition that 
agreements that do not limit liability, but that might affect the odds of a liability finding or the leverage of 
the parties in negotiating a settlement, were implicitly prohibited by the Bar Rules, we would then call into 
question many well-accepted, even laudable practices.” 
 
53
 Id. 
 
54
 Id. “Finally, there is the related issue of whether the lawyer must advise the client to obtain independent 
advice before entering into an agreement to arbitrate prospective disputes. The theory supporting such a 
requirement would be that the lawyer and client have a conflict of interest on the matter. See Maine Bar 
Rule 3.4(f)(2). Yet this is true in theory of everything that is the engagement agreement, most especially, 
for example, the percentage fee provision in a contingent fee agreement. We do think that the arbitration 
clause should be clear and should expressly reserve both the client’s right to compel Rule 9 arbitration over 
any fee dispute and the ability to file grievance complaints under Bar Rule 7.1(a), but we do not conclude 
that the presence of such an arbitration clause in an engagement agreement, without more, requires that the 
client be advised to consult other counsel.” 
 
55
 Maine Op. #170, supra note 48. “We do recognize that other jurisdictions are split on the issue at hand. 
Ohio flatly prohibits such a clause. Ohio Ethics Opinion 96-9. California permits it. California State Bar 
Formal Opinion 1989-116. Others permit the clause with conditions. Arizona Ethics Opinion 94-05; 
District of Columbia Ethics Opinion 211, Virginia Legal Ethics Opinion 1707. Coloring some of the 
various opinions from other states, we think, is a distaste for arbitration. Both Congress and Maine’s 
Legislature, however, have concluded that arbitration clauses are among the few contractual clauses 
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Commission concluded that attorney-client malpractice claims were arbitrable and such 
provisions were valid. 
Confusingly, the First Circuit also mentioned that a similar ABA Opinion 
corroborated the opinion of the Maine Commission.
56
  The First Circuit stated that the 
ABA Opinion stood for the position that “mandatory arbitration provisions are proper 
unless the retainer agreement insulates the lawyer from liability or limits the liability to 
which she otherwise would be exposed under common or statutory law.”57  However, the 
plain text of ABA Opinion 02-425 states: “it is permissible under the Model Rules to 
include in a retainer agreement with a client a provision that requires the binding 
arbitration of disputes concerning fees and malpractice claims, provided that the client 
has been fully apprised of the advantages and disadvantages of arbitration and has given 
her informed consent to the inclusion of the arbitration provision in the retainer 
agreement.”58  The ABA Committee then found malpractice claims arbitrable so long as a 
client makes a decision with informed consent.
59
 
The First Circuit seemingly misinterpreted the ABA Opinion as an unqualified 
endorsement of the arbitration of malpractice agreements, as evidenced by their citation 
to an opinion that is widely cited in states that require “informed consent” of pre-dispute 
malpractice arbitration agreements.
60
 
The District Court, on the other hand, dismissed a Louisiana case,
61
 cited by 
Bezio, that required informed consent based on the very same ABA Opinion because the 
FAA demanded the clause be enforced.
62
  The District Court considered a special 
informed consent requirement for arbitration of malpractice claims akin to the threshold 
limitation placed specifically on an arbitration provision held antithetical to the FAA in 
Casarotto.
63
  The District Court squarely addressed the opposing policies of professional 
                                                                                                                                           
meriting statutory approval and mandatory enforcement. We are not comfortable being in the position of 
suggesting in any way that such a form of dispute resolution is less favored in cases involving lawyers.” 
56
 Bezio, 737 F.3d at 823. 
 
57
 Id. at 825 (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 02-425 (2002)). 
 
58
 ABA Op. 02-425, supra note 46 (discussing retainer agreements requiring the arbitration of fee 
disputes and malpractice claims). 
 
59
 A second limitation is also included in ABA Opinion 02-425, namely that the agreement cannot 
prospectively limit malpractice liability; CARBONNEAU, supra note 41, at 360-61. While the committee 
concluded that such contractual provisions [fee and malpractice arbitration agreements] did not violate 
ethical standards, it conditioned their ethical acceptability upon a number of factors.  First, the client’s 
acceptance of the agreement to arbitrate such disputes must be based upon informed consent.  Second, the 
effect of the arbitration agreement cannot be to limit of exclude the lawyer’s liability exposure to the 
client.…The second limitation is based on Model Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 1.8(h) which forbids 
lawyers from limiting their malpractice liability through contract unless such agreements are recognized at 
law as lawful and the subscribing client is independently represented. 
 
60
 Bezio, 737 F.3d at 824 (citing Hodges v. Reasonover, 103 So. 3d 1069 (La. 2012)). 
 
61
 Hodges, 103 So. 3d 1069. 
 
62
 Bezio, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99291, at *7. 
 
63
 Id. 
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responsibility and FAA preemption and declared the FAA the victor.
64
  If the District 
Court had found the arbitration clause unenforceable because BSSN failed to obtain 
informed consent, “it would be establishing a requirement applicable only to arbitration 
clauses.”65  Such a holding would clearly be pre-empted as it “singles out arbitration 
provisions for suspect status.”66 
The District Court made a more persuasive and conclusive argument.  There is a 
strong presumption in favor of arbitrability,
67
 expressed by Congress in the FAA with its 
enforcement rooted in the Constitution.
68
  With this presumption in mind, Supreme Court 
jurisprudence establishes a broad view of the substantive claims that can be submitted to 
arbitration.
69
  Thus, by agreeing to arbitrate, a party does not forego rights, but merely 
submits their resolution to an arbitral forum.
70
   
The Supreme Court makes clear that federal preemption is the law until Congress 
amends the FAA.
71
  The Court has stated that, “our cases place it beyond dispute that the 
FAA was designed to promote arbitration.”72  With a presumption of arbitrability, FAA 
preemption applies to any state law that “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”73  "In creating a substantive 
rule applicable in state as well as federal courts, Congress intended to foreclose state 
                                                 
64
 Bezio, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99291, at *4-11. 
 
65
 Id. at 9. 
 
66
 Id. (citing Casarotto 517 U.S. at 687). 
 
67
 Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24 (questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the 
federal policy favoring arbitration). 
 
68
 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) The FAA extends to the full limits of the commerce 
clause, is binding on the states via the Supremacy Clause, and  to the extent that state rules and laws 
conflict with the FAA they are pre-empted. CARBONNEAU, supra note 41, at 129 (Court construction—
done principally by the U.S. Supreme Court—has modified considerably the language and content of the 
[FAA]….Moreover, judicial opinions have given the right to arbitrate not only a substantive character, but 
constitutional standing as well. 
 
69
 Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 132 S.Ct. 1201 (2012) (personal injury and wrongful-death 
claims); Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (state law regarding franchising); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane 
Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (Age Discrimination and Employment Act claims); Shearson Lehman/American 
Exp., Inc. v. Bird, 493 U.S. 884 (1989) (ERISA claims); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Exp., 
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (Securities Act of 1933); Shearson/American Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 
220 (1987) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 
473 U.S. 614 (1985) (antitrust claims). 
 
70
 Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 481 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 
473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985). By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive 
rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum. 
 
71
 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227. Such an intent “will be deducible from the statutes text or legislative 
history…or from an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute’s underlying purposes.” 
 
72
 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011). 
 
73
 Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 477 (1989). 
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legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements."
74
  The FAA 
“mandates enforcement of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims” unless “overridden 
by a contrary congressional command.”75  Accordingly, an agreement to arbitrate will be 
enforced unless Congress alone has created an exception to the FAA.
76
   
In order to overcome FAA preemption, the party opposing arbitration must show 
that Congress intended to exclude a claim from arbitration.
77
  Such intent “will be 
deducible from the statutes text or legislative history…or from an inherent conflict 
between arbitration and the statute’s underlying purposes.”78  In the absence of a 
Congressional intent, the Court has found that a state policy against arbitration cannot 
supersede Congress’ liberal federal policy favoring arbitration in the FAA.79  Thus, 
Congress is the only policy maker that can create an exception to the enforceability of 
arbitration agreements mandated by the FAA. 
Contract gave birth to arbitration as a method of resolving conflicts; as such an 
arbitration agreement “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”80  An attorney-
client arbitration agreement regarding malpractice claims is plainly an issue of contract.  
An informed consent requirement, mandated by the court in reliance on a non-binding 
regulatory opinion, is a specific limitation applied only the arbitrability of malpractice 
claims and not to the general contracts the arbitration agreements are contained in.  Such 
a requirement is not a ground that exists at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.   
The First Circuit has emphasized the holding of Casarotto, saying that a state is 
“preempted from imposing special restrictions on arbitration [provisions].”81  The 
informed consent requirement to arbitrate legal malpractice claims, as espoused by Bezio, 
is a special restriction on arbitration provisions.  A proper application of the preemption 
doctrine, as undertaken by the District Court, easily resolves the issue because the FAA 
preempts that informed consent requirement.  While the First Circuit’s opinion is 
consistent with the holding dictated by preemption doctrine, this result is just 
coincidence.   
                                                 
74
 Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 16. 
 
75
 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226. 
 
76
 See Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013).  For a sampling of Supreme Court 
preemption cases see Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 681 (1996) (where a state statute demanding special notice 
requirements of arbitration agreements was pre-empted.); Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008) (where a 
state law requiring administrative remedies be exhausted before arbitrating was pre-empted). 
 
77
 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227. 
 
78
 Id. 
 
79
 See supra notes 71-78. 
 
80
 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 
81
 Soto v. State Indus. Prods., Inc., 642 F.3d 67, 74 (1st Cir. 2011). 
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The First Circuit’s misplaced reliance on state advisory opinions is exactly the 
rationale subject to FAA preemption.  For example, consider states that require informed 
consent,
82
 or third party representation,
83
 before a malpractice arbitration clause can be 
agreed upon.  Applying the same rationale of the First Circuit, by relying on an advisory 
opinion requiring informed consent or third party representation, the court would be 
basing its holding on an exception espoused by the regulatory opinion of a state overseer 
instead of the Congressional exception to arbitrability.
84
  Such a barrier to arbitration 
cannot stand in the face of the preemption doctrine. 
The procedure for adoption of professional responsibility rules, on a state by state 
basis, results in jurisdictional variability more expansive than a mere circuit split.  States 
generally fall into three factions: (1) those finding malpractice claims arbitrable; (2) those 
requiring informed consent; and (3) those requiring independent counsel consultation.  
Accordingly, the method for adopting their respective rules can result in bordering states 
adopting widely different rules.  This creates troubling variability between states within 
the same Federal Appellate Circuit.  This is particularly disconcerting because courts 
generally rely on professional responsibility opinions to resolve the issue of malpractice 
arbitrability, just like the First Circuit did in Bezio, by doing so reinforcing instead of 
resolving a split on the issue. 
To highlight this variability, consider the rules in Maine and New Hampshire, 
both within the First Circuit’s jurisdiction.  As previously discussed, Maine’s Advisory 
Opinion #170 declares legal malpractice claims arbitrable, without qualification.
85
  New 
Hampshire’s respective advisory opinion, however, requires the client’s informed consent 
to make a legal malpractice arbitration agreement enforceable.
86
  Therefore, if one were 
to apply the First Circuit’s rationale in Bezio, Maine and New Hampshire would have 
differing rules because the advisory opinions espouse different requirements.  The New 
Hampshire rule, requiring informed consent, would place a special restriction on 
arbitration provisions that must be preempted by the FAA, but would not be under 
application of the First Circuit’s rationale.87   
The First Circuit’s reasoning relies on state advisory opinions, and thus reinforces 
the jurisdictional variability on the issue of whether legal malpractice claims are 
arbitrable.  Conversely, the District Court’s rationale articulated a uniform preemption 
rule that is more compliant with the federal policy favoring arbitration codified by 
Congress in the FAA.  In affirming the District Court on other reasoning, the First Circuit 
merely affirmed the jurisdictional split, thereby not resolving the underlying issue.  
                                                 
82
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Finding resolution by citing the source of the variation is a systemic problem, which will 
never produce even application of arbitration law.  The District Court relied on Casaratto 
and the preemption doctrine, both put forth by the Supreme Court whose purpose it is to 
ensure even application of law across states, which unequivocally resolves the systemic 
jurisdictional split.  Thus, in stepping back from the District Court’s rationale, the Circuit 
Court avoided a doctrinal solution to the issue. 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
While this comment does not suggest that the FAA can pre-empt a non-binding, 
persuasive ABA opinion, if the analysis of the District Court were applied, the FAA 
would in effect do so by preempting the “informed consent” rule when applied by courts.  
Thus, although the FAA cannot explicitly preempt these advisory opinions, they can 
functionally preempt them when courts rely on those opinions in establishing a barrier to 
arbitration.  In failing to affirm the rationale of the District Court, the First Circuit missed 
an opportunity to establish a doctrinal resolution to the split in authority regarding the 
validity of pre-dispute malpractice arbitration provisions.  Instead, the First Circuit 
conservatively relied on a state ethics opinion that allowed for the same result, thereby 
confusing instead of clarifying the jurisdictional variability on this issue.  In essence, the 
reasoning of the First Circuit is the very rationale that creates the split among 
jurisdictions.   
